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Abstract
Eli Broad’s approach to reforming urban public education does not recognize his own self-interest in
promoting changes within such educational systems, a classic problem of misrecognition. The Broad
agenda is an assault on the notion of the mission of public education as a service instead of a for-profit
enterprise concerned with making money for the owners and stock holders. This article examines the
backgrounds of the graduates of the Broad Superintendents Academy and raises critical issues such as
how can Broad claim that graduate preparation in educational administration is unnecessary when at
least half of his own graduates already have advanced degrees from universities in the field and occupy
high-level central office positions? Broad’s remedies harken back to those advanced by Frederick
Winslow Taylor, the creator of scientific management.
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he problem with Eli Broad and his colleagues is
that they don’t know what they don’t know. We have
to believe that he is sincere. The evidence shows that
if he is not, the millions he is pouring into “fixing” urban public
education constitutes one expensive illusion, or perhaps delusion,
as the case may be. We use here the definition of misrecognition,
advanced by Pierre Bourdieu as
The form of forgetting that social agents are caught up in and produced
by. When we feel comfortable within our roles within the social world
they seem to us like second nature and we forget how we actually have
been produced as particular kinds of people. (Webb, Schirato, &
Danaher, 2002, p. xiv)

Misrecognition is a common malady among neoliberal
pundits and reformers such as Broad and two of his most notorious
paid wordsmiths, Chester E. Finn Jr. at the Broad-funded Thomas
B. Fordham Institute and Frederick Hess of the American
Enterprise Institute, who is a consultant to the Broad Prize. These
two Broad acolytes have penned numerous pieces disagreeing with
licensure for educational leaders, advocating opening up the
pipeline to school leadership jobs to noneducators (Broad
Foundation and Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 2003), and attacking
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schools of education and school-system leadership preparation.
Hess has even created his own criteria to attack courses offered in
such programs by using their course syllabi against them (Hess &
Kelly, 2005). Their agenda has been to discredit, demean, and
denigrate university leadership preparation and the entire apparatus that defines and controls access to educational leadership. In
short, theirs is an agenda to deprofessionalize educational leadership preparation (see English, 2004, 2010; English, Papa, Mullen, &
Creighton, 2012).
What Broad and his agents miss is an understanding of their
own self-interest in their crusade—and it is a crusade, not a polite
conversation. Neoliberals like Broad play by their own rules, and
they have nothing but contempt for academic rules of conduct.
They have no qualms about doing shoddy research and going
directly to the press with the results. The National Education Policy
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Center at the University of Colorado Boulder has consistently
exposed that neoliberal think tanks bypass traditional academic
venues where research can be vetted and conclusions debated (see
Horwitz & Keefe, 2012). This leaves neoliberals with only themselves to comment on their own work, and their blind spot is how
they see their own work:
The logic of self-interest underlying all practices—particularly those in
the cultural domain—is misrecognized as a logic of ‘disinterest.’
Symbolic practices deflect attention from the interested character of
practices and thereby contribute to their enactment as disinterested
pursuits. This misperception legitimizes those practices and thereby
contributes to the reproduction of the social order in which they are
embedded. Activities and resources gain in symbolic power, or
legitimacy, to the extent that they become separated from underlying
material interests and hence to misrecognized as representing
disinterested forms of activities and resources. (Swartz, 1997, p. 90)

The article by Vachel Miller (2012) is a reasonably accurate
portrayal of the rise of the Broad venture into educational administration. We disagree with Miller’s premise that the Broad agenda is
some new attempt at school system centralization. Callahan (1962)
and Tyack (1974), among others, have documented school system
centralization as a phenomenon for the past century. The Broad
agenda differs in its determined attack on boards of education,
teacher unions, and schools of education as places or forums of
dissent. Those promoting the agenda are clear about demonizing
the practices, agencies, and locations of resistance to their plan to
crack open what they see as a harmful monopoly.
Miller (2012) was quite correct in pointing out the tenets of
machine bureaucracy and that the solution to almost all problems
from this perspective is “tighter control” (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 167). He
is not alone in visualizing the Broad venture as an assault on keeping
the public in public education (see Anderson & Pini, 2011). He and
such critics as Ravitch (2010) have pointed out that Broad is not
accountable to anyone, and they consider his autocratic self-anointed
educational vigilantism a fundamental threat to democracy.

Assessing the Results of the Broad Venture in
Educational Management: Some Tentative
Perceptions and Patterns
Broad’s assault on educational management and his work to
discredit contemporary university programs can be understood
from a perspective proffered by Bourdieu (1990) about competing
fields and the logic of practice in those fields. Miller correctly
pointed out that Broad’s background is in the private sector, where
the tenets of machine bureaucracy are primal. Because there is no
supra agency to bestow legitimacy, it remains a highly contested
environment:
Legitimacy is indivisible: there is no agency to legitimate the
legitimacy-giving agencies, because claims to legitimacy drive their
relative strength, in the last analysis, from the strength of the groups or
classes whose material and symbolic interests they directly or
indirectly express. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 2000, p.18)
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Those who have greater material and cultural capital are at an
advantage in this contestation. Broad’s millions, his ability to buy
respectability and fund and buy avenues of influence, enables his
particular perspective to find traction in the op-ed pages of the
Wall Street Journal (Riley, 2009) and through the creation of whole
organizations, such as the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. The
bottom line is that, in a capitalistic economy, money tilts the scales
of legitimacy in favor of those whose interests and agendas are the
beneficiaries.
In attempting to assess Broad’s impact in the existing educational leadership field, we should look to the track records of the
graduates of the Broad Superintendents Academy, including length
of tenure, major controversies and conflicts, and student performance data, and the graduates’ backgrounds and current and past
connections to university programs.
The on-the-job performance data that exist are spotty. To date,
there have been no serious, objective third-party evaluations of
Broad’s efforts and no comprehensive, reliable, and impartial
published accounts of what the alumni of his Superintendents
Academy have actually accomplished. The Broad venture remains
a highly individualistic project of a well-financed eccentric.
Our initial effort to assess the graduates of Broad’s
Superintendents Academy was based on data procured from the
Broad website, professional social networks, school district
websites, state department of education websites, press releases,
traditional press sources, and an array of blogs. These disparate
sources yield some interesting patterns, but the analysis has to be
considered tentative, given the lack of a uniform source. Following
are just a couple of our findings.

Educators vs. Gunslingers: Who
Really Are the Broad Leaders?
Our Internet research shows 146 Broad Superintendents
Academy graduates, at least 50% of whom were educators before
their exposure to the Broad corporate curriculum, many in
high-level central-office positions. By our determination, 20%
were from the military and 15% from the corporate sector, with
5% from various public administration roles. In 10% of the cases,
prior occupations were unknown. If half of the Broad graduates
were educators when Broad selected them for admission, then
how can we determine what value the Broad curriculum added to
the educators’ skills? And how can we support claims that it
doesn’t make any difference if an educator has had preparation in
traditional college or university programs prior to using Broad’s
academy as an alternative route?
Eisinger and Hula (2008) have called nontraditional school
administrators “gunslingers” because they are unaware of the traditional narratives that appear to shape educators, and “they have not
shaped their professional identity by championing particular
education approaches or practices” (p. 113). Gunslingers have no
loyalty to professional norms and are not concerned about their
next positions in education. They cast themselves as outsiders. In
this respect, Broad casts himself as a gunslinger, but an analysis of
his graduates show otherwise when half of them entered his
program as educators. This fact makes it extremely difficult to
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directly tie the accomplishments of Broad graduates to their
exposure to Broad’s ideology.
An interesting initial pattern discerned from the data indicated that some Broad graduates moved a lot and would most likely
conform to the “gunslinger” profile. Broad graduates often pass
through the same school districts. The New York City Department
of Education, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (North Carolina),
Prince George’s County Public Schools (Maryland), East Baton
Rouge Parish School System (New Orleans), the Chicago Public
Schools and, in particular, districts recently plagued with controversy and acrimony such as Atlanta, Kansas City, and Detroit
Public Schools and the School District of Philadelphia consistently
appear on the resumes of Broad graduates. While networking
among professionals is an understandable result of attending the
Broad Academy, the relationships that lead to these similar jobs, as
well as the relationships between Broad graduates in executive
positions and those in private and nonprofit leadership positions,
should be explored in greater detail in order to determine the
degree of influence these relationships have on public school
expenditures and hiring practices.

The military model vs. public management:
A matter of transferability.
By our calculation from Internet sources, at least 20% of the Broad
graduates are former military officers. There appears to be a natural
overlap between Broad’s professed top-down, corporate-
management style and the hierarchical structure of the military.
Public education is a “loosely coupled” bureaucracy (Weick, 1976)
that might not provide the correct context for such a leadership
philosophy. An examination of the postmilitary careers of these
members of the Broad cohort might reveal the degree to which the
Broad model is applicable in public education settings where the
norms of a professional bureaucracy are at odds with that of a
military command structure. That there is a difference in orientation has been supported by some empirical work (Nestor-Baker &
Hoy, 2001), with military leaders having a system-level orientation
as opposed to an interpersonal orientation.
The record of military officers as school superintendents is
mixed, from the data we examined. For example, one former U.S.
Army colonel was unanimously terminated by his school district’s
board for a “material breach” (Volzke, 2009) of his contract. In a
public statement, he indicated that he had “received 60 allegations
of misconduct from trustees on March 4, and he and his attorney
had refuted them in a 22-page letter back to the district. He
declined to release either document, saying it remained a personal
matter” (Volzke, 2009).

The For-Profit Mindset vs. the Pursuit of Civic
Virtue: The Issue of Public Accountability
Broad graduates’ backgrounds are a mixture of corporate for-profit
mindsets and career-oriented professional perspectives. The first
orientation is about making money. The second is about providing
a service. The common good in the private sector is that which
makes money for the stockholders or owners of an enterprise. This
is not the definition of the common good in public service. A public
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service enterprise may not make money and still be valuable (see
Boyle & Burns, 2012). A number of Broad graduates have executive
experience in the corporate management organizations that run
publicly funded charter schools. Charter schools are a central piece
of current reform agendas and, in the interest of transparency, an
investigation into the relationship between leaders of the charter
school movement and leaders in high offices of public education
certainly appears warranted. Such an investigation could dig
deeper than simply naming the players and further explore the level
of influence charter school proponents are able to bring to bear as
they work from inside state agencies or as they develop public
private partnerships with state officials.
We believe the mixing of private and public is dangerous and
erodes and harms the nature of civic virtue and the nature of the
common good. But as Miller (2012) pointed out so eloquently,
Broad could care less. That is why he and his notions of “fixing”
public education are so dangerous. The warning by Ravitch is grim:
“With so much money and power aligned against the neighborhood public school and against education as a profession, public
education itself is placed at risk” (Katz, 2012, p. B7).
We can think of no better example of this than the case of a
graduate of the Broad Superintendents Academy who resigned as
superintendent amid great controversy (Higgins, 2010) after she
had been given a vote of no confidence by district teachers, among
other setbacks. Broad had given funds to the district through his
Center for Reform of School Systems to assist in his notion of
educational reform. However, Broad canceled his support when the
superintendent abruptly resigned. Clearly there is only one way to
reform schools, the Broad way or the highway.

Summary
Billionaires such as Eli Broad are immune to the usual accountability measures, even though the funding decisions and actions his
foundations take affect a public service. There are few mechanisms
in place that ensure that Broad’s biases are subjected to a vigorous
public discussion before his opinions are implemented. Broad has
decided not to play by the usual rules of public accountability that
his competitors, such as university preparation programs, which
are subject to rigorous review by state departments of education
and national accreditation programs, must play by. The power to
ignore such processes means that the public has no protection if
Broad’s antidotes prove to be misguided or outright wrong. There
have been enough examples from the history of education that
well-funded and politically popular antidotes not only were wrong
but set public education back decades—among them, the opinions
of Frederick Winslow Taylor, the nation’s first well-paid management guru and father of scientific management, proved to be wrong
and unable to improve public education (Kanigel, 1997). There is a
compelling similarity in today’s context with respect to the
managerial notions of Eli Broad.

References
Anderson, G., & Pini, M. (2011). Educational leadership and the new economy: Keeping
the “public” in public schools. In F. W. English (Ed.), The SAGE handbook of
educational leadership (pp.176–194). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

article response

3

Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (2000). Reproduction in education, society and culture. 2nd
ed. London: Sage.
Boyle, P., & Burns, D. (2012). Preserving the public in public schools. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Education.
Broad Foundation and Thomas B. Fordham Institute (2003). Better leaders for America’s
schools: A manifesto. Retrieved February 11, 2004, from http://www.edexcellence
media.net/publications/2003/200305_betterleaders/manifesto.pdf

Horwitz, J., & Keefe, J. (2012). “Overpaid” teachers report uses bad stats, groundless
assumptions. National Education Policy Center. Retrieved January 31, 2012, from
http://nepc.colorado.edu/thinktank/review-assessing-compensation
Kanigel, R. (1997). The one best way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the enigma of efficiency.
New York: Viking.
Nestor-Baker, N., & Hoy, W. (2001). Tacit knowledge of school superintendents: Its
nature, meaning, and content. Educational Administration Quarterly, 37(1), 86–129.
Katz, S. N. (2012, March 30). Beware of big donors. The Chronicle Review, B6–B8.

Callahan, R. (1962). Education and the cult of efficiency. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Miller, V. (2012). The Broad challenge to democratic leadership: The other crisis in
education. Democracy & Education, 20(2), Article 1. Retrieved from http://
democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol20/iss2/1

Eisinger, P. K., & Hula, R. C. (2008). Gunslinger school administrators: Nontraditional
leadership in urban school systems in the United States. In J. H. Munro (Ed.),
Educational leadership (pp.111–123). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Mintzberg, H. (1983). Structure in fives: Designing effective organizations. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Ravitch, D. (2010). The death and life of the great American school system: How testing and
choice are undermining education. New York: Basic Books.

English, F. (2004). Learning “manifestospeak”: A metadiscursive analysis of the Fordham
Institute’s and Broad Foundation’s manifesto for better leaders for America’s
schools. In T. J. Lasley II (Ed.), Better leaders for America’s schools: Perspectives on
the manifesto (pp.52–91).

Riley, N. (2009, August 29–30). We’re in the venture philanthropy business. The Wall
Street Journal, A13.

English, F. (2010). The ten most wanted enemies of American public education’s school
leadership. Education Leadership Review, 11(2), 59–72.

Swartz, D., (1997). Culture and power: The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

English, F., Papa, R., Mullen, C., & Creighton, T. (2012). Educational Leadership at 2050:
Conjectures, challenges, and promises. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Education.

Tyack, D. (1974). The one best system: A history of American urban education. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.

Hess, F. W., & Kelly, A. P. (2005). Learning to lead? In preparing principals, content
matters. Education Week, 24(37), 32, 44
Higgins, S. (2010, July 12). Deborah Sims, Broad Superintendents Academy class of 2005
[Web log post]. Retrieved from http://thebroadreport.blogspot.com/2010/07/
deborah-sims-broad-superintendents.html

democracy & education, vol 20, n-o 2

Volzke, J. (2009, March 12). Superintendent Arnold Woodrow Carter fired from
Capistrano, San Clement Times. Retrieved from http://learningboosters.blogspot
.com/2009/05/federal-judge-james-selna-rules-that.html
Webb, J., Schirato, T., & Danaher, G. (2002). Understanding Bourdieu. London: Sage.
Weick, K. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative
Science Quarterly 21, 1-19.

article response

4

